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CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RICHARD S. MILLERt AND ERNEST C. WUNSCH:!: 
THE passage of the Revised Judicature Act, a major revision 
_ and reordering of the oft-amended and maze like provisions of 
the time-worn Judicature Act of 1915, was clearly the event of 
greatest moment to the Michigan Bar during the past year. This 
important new set of laws does not become effective until January 1, 
1963. In the meantime, the Michigan Supreme Court is hard at 
work examining and redrafting the rules recommendations of the Joint 
Committee on Michigan Procedural Revision in order to formulate 
a body of court rules which will become effective at the same time.1 
Because of limitations of space, this article is not the place for 
an extended examination of the new act and all its procedural 
ramifications. This can better be left to subsequent articles, symposia 
and treatises, some of which are already in progress. Suffice it, then, 
merely to mention the major procedural changes: (1) The RJA 
is worded to accomodate a procedural merger of law and equity 
should the Supreme Court see fit to take this step in the revised Rules;2 
(2) Jurisdiction over non-residents has been expanded to the due 
process limits of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution;3 (3) Formerly wide-spread provisions relating to the 
selection of jurors have been drawn together into one chapter; 4 (4) 
Traditional limitations on the place of service of process in circuit 
court actions have been eliminated and venue provisions have been 
changed;!) (5) The writ of capias ad respondendum has been abolished 
and civil actions may not be commenced by arrest;6 (6) A suit is to 
be commenced "by filing a complaint with the court" as in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;7 (7) Service of process require-
ments have been simplifiedis (8) Actions for trespass, for injunctions 
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1. The foundation of the new rules will undoubtedly be the proposed court rules 
set forth in 3 Final Report, Joint Committee on Michigan Procedural Revision (1960). 
2. If law and equity are to be merged, the merger must be effectuated through 
the new court rules. The Revised Judicature Act (RJA) merely lays the groundwork 
by eliminating separate references to "Law" and "Chancery" and by providing that 
all civil actions are commenced by filing a complaint. (RJA, § 1901.) 
3. RJA, ro. 7. 
4. RJ A, ch. 12. 
5. RJA, ch. 16. 
6. RJA, § 1815. 
7. RJA, § 1901. 
8. RJA, ch. 19. It is interesting to note that this chapter in the Revised Judica-
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against trespass, for waste and for injunctions against waste have 
been consolidated into one statutory action;9 (9) A simplified action 
for claim and delivery has been substituted for the present action of 
replevin;10 (10) The actions of ejectment, to remove a cloud on 
title, to quiet title and the action for restitution of land have been 
consolidated into one action;ll (11) Jurisdiction has been expressly 
granted to the circuit court to foreclose land contracts as well as 
mortgages;12 (12) The statutes pertaining to attachment and garnish-
ment have been reorganized;13 (13) Provisions dealing with habeas 
corpus/4 mandamus,15 and quo warrant016 have been extensively 
revised; (14) Confusing sections dealing with collection of penalties, 
fines and forfeited recognizances have been completely rewritten and 
condensed;17 (15) There has been a major revision of the rules 
relating to limitations of actions, including changes in the tolling 
provision;18 (16) Many sections relating to enforcement of judgments 
have been consolidated, with minor changes; 19 (17) Provisions for 
civil arrest have been narrowly limited;20 (18) Proceedings supple-
mentary to judgment have been improved and expanded, making it 
easier to collect from recalcitrant judgment debtors.21 
OTHER STATUTES 
During the Survey period the legislature also passed a few 
isolated acts dealing with practice and procedure. While these pale 
into insignificance along side the RJA, the more important ones are 
worth passing mention, since some of them are not repealed by the 
ture Act was intended by the Joint Committee on Michigan Procedural Revision 
to be incorporated in the court rules, not the RJ A. In its original form it included 
provision for substituted service on absent resident defendants, but in its journey from 
the proposed court rules into the RJA the substituted service provisi,)ns were lost by 
the wayside. The unfortunate result is that individual residents ml:.st be personally 
served with process, while in some cases substituted service will suffice to acquire per-
sonal jurisdiction over non-residents. The resulting discrimination against non-residents 
may create constitutional problems. It is hoped that this portion of the RJA will be 
amended to codify the Committee's final recommendations unchanged. 
9. RJA, § 2919. 
10. RJ A, § 2920. 
'11. RJA, § 2932. 
12. RJA, § 3101. 
13. RJ A, ch. 40. 
14. RJA, ch. 43. 
15. RJA, ch. 44. 
16. RJA, ch. 45. 
17. RJA, ch. 48. 
18. RJA, ch. 58. 
19. RJA, ch. 60. 
20. RJA, §§ 6075-6086. 
21. RJA, clI. 61. 
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new act, and those that are will remain in effect until January 1, 
1963. 
A recent amendment to the section of the garnishment statute 
which sets down the garnishee's liability limits that liability to 
double the amount stated in the plaintiff's affidavit to be owing him 
from the principal defendant.22 This salutary provision, in effect, 
permits the garnishee to pay the principal defendant all debts in 
excess of twice the stated amount without fear of incurring liability 
to the plaintiff. Thus, a plaintiff will find it difficult to tie up a very 
large bank account for a very small debt. 
A new act has been passed defining the jurisdiction, powers and 
procedures of justice courts or municipal courts in cities with popula-
tions of 20,000 to 30,000 persons which lie in two or more counties. 
Such courts are given jurisdiction to hear causes arising in any such 
county as if the city were located entirely in that county. Civil 
appeals from these courts may be taken to the circuit court of any 
county in which the city lies, "and the return ... on such appeal shall 
be filed in the office of the clerk of the county to which appeal is 
taken." For the purpose of determining venue in civil actions 
before such courts, for the service of process out of such courts and 
for service on juries in any such court, residents of these cities 
shall be deemed also to reside in all counties in which their city 
is located.23 
An important provision has been added to two acts relating to 
justice courts and common pleas courts which should go a long way 
to protect small debtors from being sued at inconvenient locations 
away from their homes. The new statutes grant to these courts 
exclusive jurisdiction of all civil cases where the defendant resides in 
the city where the court is located at the time the action is commenced 
unless the defendant is actually served with process issuing out of 
another justice court or municipal court while he is in the city 
where such other court is established, or unless the case is brought 
in a court of record (such as ·the circuit court) with concurrent 
jurisdiction.24 
In appeals from justice courts to circuit courts, it is no longer 
necessary for the appellant to file a bond unless he desires a stay 
of proceedings. This would appear to liberalize the former practice 
and thus make it easier for losing parties, especially impecunious 
defendants, to appeal. On the other hand, it removes the appellee's 
22. Mich. Pub. Acts 1960, No. 59, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.1856. 
23. Mich. Pub. Acts 1961, No. 42, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 27.3825(1)-.3825(5). 
24. Mich. Pub. Acts 1961, No. 98, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3651(1) (Common Pleas) ; 
Mich. Pub. Acts 1961, No. 99, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3188, § 7. 
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assurance that, should he be forced to defend an appeal and then 
win, his judgment and costs will be covered.25 
The fee schedule of justices of the peace in civil cases has been 
changed so that the justice gets a lump sum for each case-four 
dollars if no trial takes place, six dollars if there is a trial, and an 
additional two dollars for issuance of a writ of garnishment-instead 
of a few cents for each petty operation in which he engages. If this 
does not save litigants money it will at least simplify bookkeeping 
requirements.21S 
A recent statutory amendment permits substituted service on 
individuals operating under an assumed name and individuals oper-
ating as a partnership by leaving process during regular office hours 
at the office of such individual with any person in charge or by 
serving an officer or agent.21 Formerly, the Judicature Act did not 
authorize substituted service on such individuals or on co-partner-
ships.28 
Lastly, the jurisdiction of municipal courts has been changed 
to make the jurisdictional amount which formerly was merely optional 
the new standard for all such courts. Thus, these courts now have 
concurrent jurisdiction in all civil actions where the debt or damages 
does not exceed $1,000 and in all replevin actions where the value 
of the property does not exceed $1,000.29 
RECENT DECISIONS 
During the Survey period procedural matters were discussed in 
more than ninety opinions of the Michigan Supreme Court. Many of 
these, however, were merely reaffirmations of accepted principles. 
The cases which are discussed in the remainder of this article, there-
fore, have been selected because they appear to be fairly significant 
or interesting. 
Jurisdiction and Service of Process: 30 In 1958 the Michigan Su-
preme Court held that the court of chancery has inherent power even 
without an applicable statute to decide questions of the custody of 
children.31 During the year past the same case returned to the Su-
25. Mich. Pub. Acts 1961, No. 103, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3483. 
26. Mich. Pub. Acts 1961, No. 134, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3431. 
27. Mich. Pub. Acts 1961, No. 157, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.759. 
28. See Defoe v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 252 Mich. 337, 233 N.W. 335 (1930). 
29. Mich. Pub. Acts 1961, No. 196, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3937 (22). 
30. Schoener v. Continental Motors Corp., 362 Mich. 303, 106 N.W.2d 774 (1961), 
an important case dealing with jurisdiction over intangible property for purposes of 
escheat is discussed in the Conflict of Laws article, this Survey. Couyoumjian v. 
Anspach, 360 Mich. 371, 103 N.W.2d 587 (1960), which involves residence require-
ments for divorce, is treated in the Family Law article, this Survey. 
3!. Sovereign v. Sovereign, 354 Mich. 65, 92 N.W.2d 585 (195S.). 
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preme Court raising the question of the court's authority, absent a 
statute, to award allowances and attorney's fees to the mother in such 
a custody hearing. The court held that the power to award reasonable 
expenses and attorney's fees is incidental to its jurisdiction to decide 
the matter of custody.32 
Two labor law cases raised the interesting question whether a 
mere conclusionary allegation of lack of subject matter jurisdiction in 
defendant's answer, unaccompanied by supporting facts or evidence 
at the trial, throws a burden on the court to independently decide 
this jurisdictional question. In both cases the defendants alleged in 
their answers that the state courts were without jurisdiction to hear 
the matter because of federal preemption. In the first case, H aenlein 
'V. Saginaw Bldg. Trades Council,33 the defendant did not appear 
to defend after answering. In the second, Andrus 'V. Local 69,34 a trial 
took place but the appendi"{ contained no proofs on the matter of 
preemption. In both cases the court refused to consider the juris-
dictional question, affirming plaintiff's decree in H aenlein and dis-
missing the defendant's appeal in Andrus. Perhaps the court is 
correct in refusing to take upon itself the task of determining whether 
the particular suit is one exclusively within the jurisdiction of the 
NLRB, particularly where the defendant offers no assistance in 
making the determination. However, such a refusal leaves in its wake 
a question of the effect of the affirmative decree. Lack of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter ordinarily means lack of power. Unlike the 
similar problem of personal jurisdiction, failure to directly attack 
a decree rendered without subject matter jurisdiction will not neces-
sarily estop the defendant from subsequently attacking the decree 
collaterally, especially where there is a strong policy against taking 
jurisdiction.30 If defendant ignores the decree, he may again be able 
to raise the jurisdictional question when he is attached for contempt, 
or enforcement of the decree may be enjoined by a federal court.36 
Perhaps, then, it would be better for the court to decide the juris-
dictional issue once and for all in the first proceeding in which the 
question is raised,37 even though it is not raised in a manner entirely 
satisfactory to the court, since to do so might prevent the "yo-yo" 
effect of dismissing one appeal and having the same question raised, 
to the great inconvenience of the court and the winning litigant, in 
a subsequent proceeding. 
32. Sovereign v. Sovereign, 361 Mich. 528, 106 N.W.2d 146 (1960). 
33. 361 Mich. 263, 105 N.W.2d 166 (1960). 
34. 362 Mich. 635, 108 N.W.2d 31 (1961). 
35. Restatement, Judgments § 10 (1942). 
36. See 62 Stat. 968 (1948), 28 U.S.C. 2283 (1948). 
37. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h). 
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The ghost-like statute of limitations which, having been laid 
to rest by timely commencement of suit, reappears to haunt litigants 
when they later seek alias summonses, prankishly caused the dismissal 
of at least two apparently valid causes of action in Lacney v. Wells38 
and Hammel v. Bettison.39 In both cases the statute of limitations 
would have expired prior to the return date of the summons if the suit 
had not already been commenced.40 In Lacney the sheriff did not 
return the unserved summons until sixty-five days after the return 
date, and then only after the court suggested to counsel that an 
alias summons would not be issued until the original was returned. 
In Hammel the sheriff promptly returned the summonses endorsed 
"not found" the day after the last day for service. Counsel found 
them on his desk when he returned from a tour of active duty in the 
Army Reserve ten days later but waited about three more weeks 
before filing petitions for aliases. In both cases the court held that 
the failure to exercise diligence to secure aliases immediately after 
the return dates constituted a break in the continuity of the suits 
which, therefore, were barred by the statute of limitations.41 
The RJA should remove at least some of the uncertainty which 
has caused the unhappy results in Lacney and Hammel. It pro-
vides for a flat ninety days after process is "placed in the hands 
of an officer for immediate service" during which the statute of 
limitations will be tolled. After this period expires the time will again 
commence to run.42 
Pleadings, Amendments and Remedies: That there is vitality 
in the rules which require declarations to contain a statement "of the 
facts on which the pleader relies"43 and "such spedfic allegations 
as will reasonably inform the defendant of the nature of the cause 
he is called upon to defend"44 was illustrated in the case of Scott v. 
Cleveland.45 Plaintiff's declaration alleged in subtance that one 
defendant had negligently run into the rear end of the cab in which 
plaintiff was riding and that defendant cab driver had also been 
negligent in stopping too suddenly. This view of the accident was 
38. 362 Mich. 605, 107 N.W.2d 883 (1961). 
39. 362 Mich. 396, 107 N.W.2d 887 (1961). 
40. In Lacney v. Wells the court remanded the case to determine whether the 
statute of limitations had been sufficiently tolled by defendant's absence from the 
state to overcome the late application for an alias. 
41. See the leading case of Yeager v. Mellus, 328 Mich. 2~3, 43 N.W.2d 836 
(1950), and Home Savings Bank v. Young, 295 Mich. 725, 295 N.W. 474 (1940). 
Also see M.C.R. 13, §§ 1 & 2 and comment in Honigman, Mich. Court Rules Annat. 
20 (Supp. 1959). 
42. RJA, § 5856(3). 
43. M.C.R. 17, § 1. 
44. M.C.R. 19, § 1. 
45. 360 Mich. 322, 103 N.W.2d 631 (1960). 
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also incorporated in the pre-trial statement of plaintiff's claim. At the 
trial, however, plaintiff attempted in his opening statement to state 
that the accident occurred when defendant cab driver swerved 
sharply from one lane into another in front of the second defendant. 
Over defendants' objections the trial court permitted the plaintiff 
to amend his pleadings to conform to his new theory, but gave the 
defendants no opportunity either to formally deny the amended 
declaration or to prepare a defense thereto. On appeal from a judg-
ment for the plaintiff the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for 
a new trial, holding that general allegations of negligence or reckless-
ness contained in plaintiff's original declaration would not support 
proof of the sudden swerving, and that the trial court abused its 
discretion by permitting plaintiff to change from one theory to 
another without giving defendants a reasonable opportunity to prepare 
a defense to the new theory.46 
In the important case of Wells v. Detroit News, Inc.4? plaintiff 
sued The Detroit News, Inc. to recover retirement benefits only to 
discover to his dismay after the statute of limitations had expired 
that he should have sued The Detroit News or The Evening News 
Association, a different corporation. He then sought leave to amend 
by changing the name of the defendant, but his motion was denied 
by the trial judge. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, treating 
the case not as a substitution of parties, which would be beyond 
the court's power, but merely as a case of misnomer where amend-
ment is permitted "for the furtherance of justice.,,48 The court based 
its decision on the fact that the substituted defendant had from the 
outset actual notice of the claim, so that the policy of the statute 
of limitiations-to prevent the bringing of stale claims-was not 
violated; that service was made upon a person who represented both 
corporations at the address of both corporations; and that both cor-
porations were engaged in "the same general business, have most of 
the same officers, and are represented by the same law: firm." 
Justices Black and Kelley dissented, arguing that this was not merely 
a case of misnomer, but that the wrong defendant had in fact been 
sued and the right defendant was no longer suable. Perhaps the 
46. Compare Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960), 
where amendment was held to be proper where it creates no new cause of action, no 
surprise is claimed and no prejudice to the defendant appears, and Waltanen v. Wiitala, 
361 Mich. 504, 105 N.W.2d 400 (1960) where the Supreme Court sustained the direction 
of a verdict for the defendant on the grounds of assumption of risk even though 
the defendant did not plead it and no mention of it appears in the pre-trial statement. 
Apparently, however, the plaintiff failed to object to the directed verdict on this 
ground. If he had, the principal case and Waltanen would be irreconcilable. 
47. 360 Mich. 634, 104 N.W.2d 767 (1960). 
48. On authority of Mich. Compo Laws § 616.1 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.8.,8 
(1938) and M.C.R. 25. 
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dissenters are technically correct, but one's heart, if not one's head, 
goes out to the majority who must have tacitly recognized that in a 
complex society which provides a variety of tantalizing benefits for 
multiple incorporation of activities which might otherwise be carried 
on by a single entity, it sometimes takes a Houdini to figure out 
which corporation is doing what to whom. 
For those who doubt that defective pleadings can result in 
dismissal with prejudice, a glance at Stann v. Ford Motor CO.49 
should prove illuminating. There the plaintiff alleged in general terms 
that the defendant hospital failed to exercise reasonable prudence in 
caring for the plaintiff and that the failure resulted in his injuries. 
"The only specific breach of duty the hospital was charged with having 
violated was: 'To employ competently trained nurses, physicians, 
surgeons, interns and other employees.'" No other facts alleging a 
breach of duty were alleged. The trial court sustained a motion to 
dismiss and the Supreme Court affirmed. While there is no question 
that these pleadings could not have sustained a judgment for the 
plaintiff, the better view, suggested by Mr. Justice Black in his dissent, 
would have been to order more definite pleadings, rather than to 
dismiss. As the case now stands, one cannot tell whether the result 
followed from inadequate facts or from inadequate draftsmanship of 
the pleadings. In this enlightened era, more than one hundred years 
after Dickens' Bleak House, loss of rights for purely technical reasons 
should be avoided whenever strong policy does not compel dismissal. 
Other cases dealing with pleading, amendments and remedies 
held (1) that notwithstanding Court Rule 17, section 10,60 defendant 
is not bound by apparent admissions in his first sworn answer to 
plaintiff's bill where his amended sworn answer refutes such admis-
sions;51 (2) that in a suit against two former partners based on a 
written lease signed by one, the plaintiff may not establish liability 
under the common counts against the other;52 (3) that vendors in a 
land contract who earlier commenced proceedings before a circuit 
court commissioner to recover possession by virtue of a forfeiture had 
elected their remedy and, therefore, would not be permitted to file 
a cross-bill seeking the inconsistent remedy of foreclosure to vendee's 
suit to rescind the land contract for fraud; 53 and (4) that it is an 
49. 361 Mich. 225, 105 N.W.2d 20 (1960). 
50. "Any statement of facts set forth in any pleading shall be treated as an 
admission by the pleader and need not be proved by the opposite party." 
51. Jackson Broadcast & Tel. Corp. v. State Bd. of Agric., 360 Mich. 481, 104 
N.W.2d 350 (1960). Accord, Honigman, Mich. Court Rules Annot. 112 (1949). 
52. LaHood v. WieIadt, 361 Mich. 99, 105 N.W.2d 39 (1960). See Geistert v. 
Scheffler, 316 Mich. 325, 25 N.W.2d 241 (1946). 
53. WeIling v. Dave's Cut Rate Drugs, Inc., 362 Mich. 389, 107 N.W.2d 798 
(1961) • 
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abuse of the trial judge's discretion to permit plaintiffs to amend their 
declaration after proofs are closed to conform to a theory never 
raised or argued at the trial, and on which the judge intends to 
ground his decision for the plaintiff, without first offering the defend-
ants an opportunity to "answer, reopen proofs, and brief and argue 
the issue prior to decision.))[;4 
Res Judicata and Estoppel: Two recent cases unearthed a booby 
trap for attorneys: The winning facts in the main action may become 
the basis of defeat in subsequent garnishment proceedings. In 
Rodgers 'V. Mikolajczak55 plaintiff, suing to recover for personal 
injuries suffered while a passenger in a truck, was held in the original 
action to be an "acting employee" of the defendant driver and not 
a "guest passenger." He recovered judgment and did not appeal from 
this determination. In this garnishment suit against the principal 
defendant's insurer, however, the former determination was held 
binding on the plaintiff, with the result that the garnishee insurance 
company was exempted from liability to the principal defendant's 
estate since the policy did not cover the death of insured's employees. 
A similar result was reached in Burgess 'V. Holder56 where the plain-
tiff successfully established that she was a passenger for hire in the 
first action, but lost to the garnishee insurer in the second on the 
ground that the policy excluded liability for injury to paying pas-
sengers. The application of estoppel in such a situation is fraught 
with dangers, particularly where the winning determination in the 
principal suit is not exactly the same as the losing determination 
in the garnishment action. The facts which suffice to avoid the guest 
passenger statute may differ both in quality and in amount from the 
facts necessary to activate the exclusionary clause of the insurance 
policy. Furthermore, even assuming that the issues in the two actions 
are the same, it does not follow that all the issues decided in the 
first action are binding on the parties to the second. Collateral 
estoppel only applies where the two actions are between the same 
parties or their privies. In strict theory, the insurance company is 
not a privy of the defendant.57 Nor does the fact that the garnishment 
action is only ancillary to the main suit,58 in the sense that it depends 
upon the judgment in the main suit and serves only to help enforce 
that judgment, help to answer the question whether the parties to 
54. Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777, 791 
(1960). Strictly speaking, however, this part of the decision was dictum, since the 
decision for the plaintiff was affirmed on other grounds. 
55. 361 Mich. 61, 105 N.W.2d 25 (1960). 
56. 362 Mich. 53, 106 N.W.2d 379 (1960). 
57. See Restatement, Judgments § 84, comment d, illustration 17 (1942). 
58. Rodgers v. Mikolajczak, 361 Mich. 61, 67, 105 N.W.2d 25, 28 (1960). 
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the garnishment suit should be bound by all the issues decided in 
the principal suit. This characterization sheds no light 011 the applica-
tion of the doctrine of res judicata because it does not involve the 
policies underlying that doctrine. It is respectfully suggested, there-
fore, that unless the insurance company actually controls the defense 
of the main suit and the plaintiff has notice of such control, the court 
should not rely on res judicata to prevent the plaintiff from taking 
inconsistent positions in the two suits.59 Rather, the plaintiff's attempt 
to change horses in mid stream can be discouraged merely by admit-
ting his allegations and testimony in suit one as admissions in suit two. 
City oj Madison Heights 'V. Drainage Board60 also involved 
an interesting application of res judicata. In an earlier proceeding 
the City of Madison Heights intervened as a defendant on the side 
of the Drainage Board in a suit brought by other towns and cities 
to enjoin the financing and construction of the Twelve Town Drain 
System. In that suit the court had approved the formula for the 
apportionment of costs among the towns involved. Subsequently, 
plaintiff City brought suit, this time as an adversary of the Drainage 
Board, objecting to the application of the earlier approved formula. 
The court held that the plaintiff, as an intervenor in the earlier suit, 
albeit an inactive one, was bound by that formula. The fact that it 
had filed no formal pleadings in the earlier suit was held to be 
irrelevant. The interesting question, decided but not fully discussed 
in the opinion, is whether one defendant in an action is bound by facts 
determined in that action in a subsequent suit brought by it against 
its former codefendant. It may be suggested that in such a case it 
should make a difference whether the parties were in fact adversaries, 
even though co-parties, in the first action.61 When, as in the case at 
bar, they were not contesting the validity of the formula as between 
themselves, they should not necessarily be bound by collateral 
estoppel as to the validity of the formula in a subsequent suit between 
themselves. That the court will focus a jaundiced eye 011 parties who 
take inconsistent positions in successive suits is understandable; and 
they are certainly free to take note of admissions made in the first 
suit. But to hold that it is res judicata which binds the parties as to 
matters which were never litigated between them or their privies and 
which they had no reasonable opportunity to litigate, e;~tends undue 
59. This is the position of the Restatement of Judgments, supra note 57. Of 
course, even if the insurance company does control the principal suit and the plaintiff 
does have notice of its control, the plaintiff should not be estopped unless the issues in 
the two suits are the same. 
60. 361 Mich. 522, 106 N.W.2d 126 (1960). 
61. See Restatement, Judgments § 82 (1942), and also see, by way of analogy, 
Id., § 106, comments b, c and f at pages 505, 506, 509, respectively. 
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dignity to non-adversary proceedings. In fairness to the court, how-
ever, it must be noted that the result could have been justified on 
the ground that, being a proceeding in equity, the City of Madison 
Heights had the opportunity in the first proceeding to seek to uphold 
the validity of the drain system on other grounds and at the same time 
contest the apportionment formula. Having had this chance to 
litigate this issue as against the Drainage Board, it is now bound 
by res judicata. 
In Henry 'V. Henry62 the court agreed with a trial judge who 
treated his denial of a pre-trial motion to dismiss plaintiff's bill 
for a declaratory judgment on the grounds that there was no actual 
controversy as res judicata at the trial which followed. This usage 
of the term res judicata is most unfortunate; the court's order denying 
the motion should not conclusively bind the parties at the same trial.63 
Compare, for example, the ordinary denial of a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a cause of action. Traditionally, the defendant 
has had the right to reassert his objection to the declaration at or 
after the tria1.64 The most that can be said for such a ruling is that 
it is the law of the case unless and until the judge is persuaded to 
change his mind. If we are not to prevent judges from correcting 
their own errors prior to judgment, the losing party should not be 
estopped from again raising the issue at the trial. This is especially 
true where, as here, the point is jurisdictional. 
In another important decision the court held that where the 
dismissal of an action is based on several possible grounds, only one 
of which would bar a subsequent suit, and it is not clear from the 
judge's opinion which of these grounds caused the dismissal, in a later 
suit for the same cause of action between the same parties the burden 
is on the defendant who asserts the defense of res judicata to prove 
that the original suit was dismissed for the reason which would bar 
the second suit.65 
Motions: It is a well accepted principle that disputed material 
questions of fact are not to be decided by the judge on motion for 
summary judgment, especially where a jury trial has rightfully been 
62. 362 Mich. 85, 106 N.W.2d 570 (1960). 
63. The so-called res judicata effect of the dismissal of the motion may have 
been based on an alleged stipulation between the parties that the dismissal should be 
with prejudice in order that a judge different from the one who decided the motion 
might be eligible to hear the case under local rule 7, § 1 of the Wayne County Court 
Rules. See Appellee's Brief, pp. 1-4. 
M. See Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law, 149 ff. (1922). 
65. E & G Finance Co. v. Simms, 362 Mich. 592, 107 N.W.2d 911 (1961). 
Accord, Restatement, Judgments § 49, comment c (1942). The court rejected the 
view which presumes in such a case that all issues were decided in favor of the de-
fendant. 
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claimed.66 The application of this salutary rule, however, occasionally 
brings the justices to loggerheads. Thus, in City of Detroit 'V. Eisele67 
the majority affirmed the granting of a summary judgment for de-
fendant on the ground that plaintiff's declaration and counteraffidavit 
to defendant's motion were insufficient as a matter of law to raise a 
factual issue. Justices Dethmers, Kavanagh and Black, however, 
would have reversed on the ground that the defendant's affidavit in 
support of summary judgment was "no more than an allegation of 
mixed fact and law ... " and was, therefore, insufficient to sustain the 
judgment. Thus, the majority places the burden of establishing the 
existence of a material issue of fact on the party against whom the 
motion is brought, while the dissenters would cast this burden on 
the movant. 
Jackson Broadcasting and Tel. Corp. 'V. State BoaI'd of Agric.68 
is an indication of how far the modern motion to dismiss differs 
from the common law demurrer. Defendant in its answer moved to 
dismiss plaintiff's bill for an injunction on the ground that it did 
not state a cause of action. An affidavit was filed in support of the 
motion. In granting the motion, the circuit judge considered not 
only the bill of complaint, which on its face set forth a cause of 
action, but also defendant's answer and affidavit. The Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding that the motion to dismiss could be treated as a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings-i.e., all the pleadings could be 
considered to determine whether the movant was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. It should also be noted that the affidavit was held 
to be properly considered even though, as dissenting Justices Black and 
Kavanagh point out, this motion is not one of those enumerated in 
Court Rule 18, section 1, wherein it is expressly provided that sup-
porting affidavits may be used. 
At common law a plaintiff who sensed impending defeat during 
the course of trial could voluntarily nonsuit himself at any time before 
verdict without relinquishing his right to sue again on the same cause 
of action. That this privilege has been substantially modified by Court 
Rule 38 was reaffirmed in Danziger 'V. Village of Bingham Farms.69 
At the trial plaintiff orally requested and got a nonsuit after he had 
rested his case when the trial judge indicated he was about to grant 
defendant's motion to dismiss. On appeal the Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that Court Rule 38 applies to nonsuits as well as 
66. M.C.R. 30. See Honigman, Mich. -Court Rules Annot. 301 (1949). 
67. 362 Mich. 684, 108 N.W.2d 763 (1961). 
68. 360 Mich. 481, 104 N.W.2d 350 (1960). 
69. 362 Mich. 629, 107 N.W.2d 786 (1961). See Pear v. Graham, 258 Mich. 
161, 241 N.W. 865 (1932). 
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to discontinuances and that, if the motion is filed after the answer, it 
must be in writing supported by an affidavit.70 
Limitations of Actions: Several important cases concerning limi-
tations of actions were handed down during the Survey period. 
In Hammel 'V. Bettison,71 a case of first impression, the Supreme 
Court unanimously adopted the rule that the absence of the defendant 
from the state shall not suspend the running of the statute of limi-
tations where the defendant was amenable to substituted service 
during the period of his absence.72 
In Baatz 'V. Smith73 the court, Justices Smith, Kavanagh and 
Souris vigorously dissenting, held that an action in assumpsit against 
a hotel to recover for personal injuries suffered while a paying guest 
was to be treated as an action for "injuries to person" and not for 
breach of contract. Therefore, the three year rather than the six year 
statute of limitations applies. While recognizing that the plaintiff may 
well be basing his claim on the breach of a contractual relationship 
between guest and hotel, one is nonetheless constrained to agree with 
the majority if the policy behind the statute of limitations is taken 
into account: The prosecution of stale claims, long out of mind, is 
to be avoided; personal injury facts are legislatively presumed to 
be more susceptible to the caprices of memory and time than evidence 
of contract. Thus, in this action a contract must be proven but so 
must the claim of injury to the person, with all its difficulties of proof. 
Therefore, the shorter, not the longer, limitation period should apply. 
Furthermore, the advent of "fact pleading" has made the form of 
action irrelevant so far as the statute of limitations is concerned. 
A Michigan statute74 provides for a one year extension of the 
period of limitation if process is not served within that period by 
virtue of "any default or neglect of the officer to whom it is com-
mitted." In Lacney 'V. Wells75 plaintiff's hopes of utilizing this section 
were dashed by his failure to establish by affidavit or otherwise why 
it took the sheriff sixty-five days after the return date to return the 
unserved summons or to take the steps available to him under Court 
70. By statute a discontinuance or nonsuit may not be entered after the defendant 
enters upon his defense unless the defendant consents. Mich. Compo Laws § 615.8 
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.833 (1938). The language of the principal case seems to 
imply that the fact that the plaintiff has rested his case does not mean that the defendant 
has entered upon his defense. Cf. Honigman, Mich. Court Rules Annot. 426 (1949). 
71. 362 Mich. 396, 107 N.W.2d 887 (1961). 
72. Accord, R.J .A., § 5853. 
73. 361 Mich. 68, 104 N.W.2d 787 (1960). See Coates V. Milner Hotel, Inc., 311 
Mich. 233, 18 N.W.2d 389 (1945). 
74. Mich. Compo Laws § 609.19 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.611 (1938). 
75. 362 Mich. 605, 107 N.W.2d 883 (1961). 
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Rule 15, section 2, to force the sheriff to return it. Thus, counsel are 
again warned76 that the foregoing statute will only operate in their 
favor when they are not themselves chargeable with any of the 
neglect leading to the failure to make timely service. 
One other case is worthy of note77 : In Klosky 'U. Dick78 the 
court held that the disability of a minor to sue is not removed when 
a guardian or next friend is appointed to sue on his behalf, but only 
when he reaches the age of twenty-one. Thus, a suit on a judgment 
which was rendered in his favor more than ten years before is not 
barred by the ten year statute of limitations which begins to run after 
the disability is removed, where less than ten years have elapsed 
since his twenty-first birthday. 
Trial: Instructions to the Jury: In Wright '1.1. Delray Connecting 
R.R.'Z9 a very large jury verdict for plaintiff was sustained when the 
court held it was not error for the judge to charge the jury that 
plaintiff, suing to recover for personal injuries, had already received 
workmen's compensation payments in a stated amount and would 
have to repay to the insurer the amounts so received out of any 
recovery from the defendant. By virtue of an agreement between 
them, both plaintiff's and defendant's counsel had, without objection, 
referred to the workmen's compensation payments in thdr statements 
to the jury, and the trial judge had instructed the jury that the receipt 
of such payments should not be considered in fixing liability. In 
view of the special circumstances just mentioned, this case should not 
be taken to support the proposition that it is proper in a personal 
injury case to mention in opening or closing arguments or otherwise 
that the workmen's compensation insurer has made payments to 
the plaintiff. 
The opinion in Martiniano '1.1. Booth80 contains an excellent expo-
sition of the duty of the judge presiding at a jury trial with respect 
to his instructions to the jury. Nothwithstanding Court Rule 37, sec-
tion 9, which provides that "failure to instruct on any point of law 
shall not be ground for setting aside the verdict of the jury unless 
such instruction is requested," the judge must charge the jury as to 
the law governing the "substantial issues" even though no request 
is made. However, as to specific points and details the court rule 
applies; it is not error to exclude such details unless they are re-
quested. Going one step further, even if a detailed charge is requested, 
76. See Home Savings Bank v. Fuller, 299 Mich. 9, 299 N.W. 787 (1941). 
77. See also Wells v. Detroit News, Inc., 360 Mich. 634, 104 N.W.2d 767 (1960) 
discussed supra, this article. 
78. 359 Mich, 615, 103 N.W.2d 618 (1960). 
79. 361 Mich. 619, 106 N.W.2d 247 (1960). 
80. 359 Mich. 680, 103 N.W.2d 502 (1960). 
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the failure to give such charge will not constitute error if the attorney 
acquiesces by silence in the instruction actually given, especially 
where, as in this case, the attorney did not complain of the failure 
when the trial judge asked him if the instructions were satisfactory. 
Other, more familiar, points are also reviewed in the opinion, which 
should prove a useful reference for trial attornies and judges. 
Another important ruling was handed down in Bishop v. Plumb.s1 
There the plaintiff wife was suing to recover for injuries suffered 
while riding in a car driven by her husband which collided with 
defendant's automobile. By consent of the parties her suit was con-
solidated for trial with that of her husband. In his instructions to 
the jury the judge charged that the negligence of the husband could 
not be imputed to the wife. A subsequent jury verdict of $1,000 
for the wife was overturned on her appeal on the ground that the 
judge should also have instructed the jury that the plaintiff wife was 
entitled to her full damages even if her husband was contributorily 
negligent. The failure to separate the question of the wife's damages, 
as well as her right to recover, from the husband's negligence consti-
tuted reversible error even in the absence of a request to charge. 
The recurring question of when the rebuttable presumption of 
negligence raised by the "assured clear distance" rule is rebutted 
was raised again in Garrigan v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co.S2 
The majority held that the presumption can only be taken from the 
jury's consideration when there is, "at the very least, clear, positive 
and credible evidence opposing the presumption." Otherwise, the 
jury is to be "instructed to apply the presumption unless it finds from 
the evidence that the presumptioin has been rebutted." Mr. Justice 
Black concurred in reversing plaintiff's judgment arguing, as is 
his wont, that the court did not go far enough; that the presumption 
is only rebutted as a matter of law when reasonable minds can not 
fail to be convinced that there is no negligence. Otherwise, he would 
leave it to the jury to decide if the presumption has been rebutted. 
Dissenting Justices Carr, Kelly and Dethmers, however, urged that 
the presumption should fall as soon as credible evidence is introduced 
to explain the actual circumstances.s3 
Trial: Directed Verdicts and New Trials: The somewhat unusual 
procedure of directing a verdict for the party who has the burden of 
proving the decisive issue appeared in Nabozny v. Hamil.s4 There, 
81. 363 Mich. 87, 108 N.W.2d 813 (1961). 
82. 362 Mich. 262, 106 N.W.2d 807 (1961). 
83. For a discussion of the ramifications of the principal case see Professor 
Quick's article on Evidence in this Survey. 
84. 361 Mich. 544, 106 N.W.2d 230 (1960). See also WaItanen v. Wiitala, 361 
Mich. 504, 105 N.W.2d 400 (1960) and Whitby v. Wiedeman, 362 Mich. 383, 107 
N.W.2d 779 (1961). 
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the court, for the first time in its history,85 upheld the directing of a 
verdict for the plaintiff on the facts in a negligence action. In Michi-
gan the traditional rule, expressed by Mr . Justice Cooley in the 
leading case of Wooden v. Durjee,86 has been that "evidence is for 
the jury, and the trial judge cannot draw conclusions from them. . . . 
A jury may disbelieve the most positive evidence, even when it stands 
uncontradicted; and the judge cannot take from them their right 
of judgment." Nabozny now substitutes a new rule: In all cases 
where the trial judge would have the power to set aside a verdict 
rendered against the party having the burden of proof and order a 
new trial on the ground that reasonable men could not disagree that 
the opposite verdict was called for, he may now direct a verdict. 
Thus, the jury never gets the opportunity to render the "unreason-
able" verdict. This new rule has its good and bad aspects: On the 
one hand, the existence of insurance coverage in most negligence cases 
opens the door to possible collusion between the plaintiff and a de-
fendant who may not himself have to pay the verdict. If the judge 
directs a verdict for the plaintiff he takes from the "hidden defendant" 
-the insurance company-the· protection afforded by having the jury 
exercise its own opinion whether the evidence was contri.ved. It should 
be noted that the court made special mention in Nabozny of the 
fact that there was no issue of credibility in the case, thereby implying 
that if such an issue were raised the jury should still have the oppor-
tunity to pass on the evidence.s7 But, isn't the credibility of wit-
nesses automatically an issue in every case where the verdict is 
grounded on the evidence and not the lack of it? On the other hand, 
the new rule recognizes that in the vast majority of the cases where 
a judge decides that a verdict is against the great weight of evidence, 
a new trial is just a waste of time; the retrial is a luxury which cannot 
be afforded if today's congested dockets are considered. Regardless 
of which aspect is deemed the more important, the fact remains that 
the new rule modifies the traditional right to trial by jury. 
The impressive sum of $125,000 awarded to a fifty-two-year-
old man completely disabled by the injury for which he sought re-
covery was held not to be excessive in Wright 'V. Delray Connecting 
R.R.88 And in Wycko 'V. Gnodtke89 the court refused to overturn a 
verdict of approximately $15,000 to parents for the negligently 
85. See dissent of Mr. Justice Black, 361 Mich. at 545, 106 N.W.2d at 236, 237. 
86. 46 Mich. 424, 9 N.W. 457 (1881). 
87. The court has recently reaffirmed the rule that credibility of witnesses is a 
matter for the jury. Bridwell v. Segel, 362 Mich. 102, 106 N.W.2d 386 (1960). 
88. 361 Mich. 619, 106 N.W.2d 247 (1960). 
89. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960). 
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caused death of their minor son.90 In Turner v. Cotham,91 however, 
the Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge that a verdict for 
plaintiff in the exact amount requested by the plaintiff's attorney, 
rendered after only four minutes of deliberation on the question of 
damages, should be set aside on the ground that it was obvious that 
the jury did not determine damages in accordance with the judge's 
charge. 
Trial: Verdicts: At common law the jury, in order to protect 
itself from an attaint, could elect to return a special verdict, merely 
finding the facts, rather than a general verdict in which they applied 
the law to the facts. This election fell into desuetude, however, when 
the harsh remedy of attainder was abolished. Today, therefore, the 
jury must ordinarily return a general verdict unless specifically in-
structed to return a special verdict or to answer special questions. 
A recent case,D2 however, indicates that if the jury should return 
a special verdict along with its general verdict, and if the losing party 
does not object, the entire verdict will be effective. The jury's verdict 
was worded thusly: "Well, after due and careful consideration of all 
the facts we have gathered from the testimony on the witness stand, 
and court data furnished, we find no evidence of neglect on the part 
of the defendant .... Therefore, no cause for action." The Supreme 
Court held that since it' was clear that the verdict was based on the 
absence of negligence, and not contributory negligence, an erroneous 
charge on the issue of contributory negligence could not have preju-
diced the plaintiff. Thus, this hybrid verdict effectively limited the 
grounds on which plaintiff could appeal. 
Relief from Judgment or Decree: In Haenlein v. Saginaw Bldg. 
Trades Council93 the Supreme Court held that a defendant against 
whom a default decree has been rendered is not entitled to a rehearing 
on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction94when it is re-
quested more than four months after the entry of the default. De-
fendants in their answer had alleged by way of conclusion and without 
supporting facts that exclusive jurisdiction of the cause was vested in 
the N.L.R.B. The trial court ordered the answer stricken unless an 
90. Other cases in which the court refused to disturb the verdict because of ex-
cessiveness or inadequacy were Teller v. Geo.rge, 361 Mich. 118, 104 N.W.2d 918 
(1960) ($1,500 not inadequate); Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich. 1, 105 
N.W.2d 1 (1960) ($20,000 not excessive) and Scho v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 360 Mich. 
353, 103 N.W.2d 469 (1960) ($50,000 not excessive). 
91. 361 Mich. 198, 105 N.W.2d 237 (1960). 
92. Termaat v. Bohn Aluminum & Brass Co., 362 Mich. 598, 107 N.W.2d 783 
(1961). 
93. 361 Mich. 263, 105 N.W.2d 166 (1960). 
94. See discussion of the same case under the heading "Jurisdiction," supra this 
article. 
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amendment was filed, but defendants did not amend. Subsequently, 
after a hearing, a default decree was endered against tbe defendants. 
In refusing to grant the rehearing the court distinguished last year's 
case of Moody v. Carnegie,95 where a decree was reopened after 
the four month period had expired, on the ground that the defendants 
in Haenlein, unlike the plaintiff in Moody, were not improperly de-
prived of their rights to appear and testify. Taken together these 
two cases leave the law in a curious posture: A perfectly valid decree 
may be reopened after the prescribed time for requesting a rehearing 
has passed if the aggrieved party can show that his own attorney has 
negligently or fraudulently permitted the entry of an unfavorable 
decree, but a decree which may actually be void for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction cannot be reopened after the rule-prescribed 
period has elapsed if the aggrieved party had opportunity to contest 
jurisdiction at the original hearing. 
Appellate Review: The court rules relating to appealso6 opti-
mistically require appellant to file an unbiased and non-argumentative 
statement of the facts of the case, "both favorable and unfavorable." 
(Emphasis added.) In addition, an appendix must be filed containing, 
among other things, "all parts of the record which should be considered 
by the court in order to fairly judge the issues on appeal from the 
standpoint of both appellant and appellee." (Emphasis added.) 
Whether out of penury, forced habit or ignorance, the files in an 
inordinate number of cases brought to the Supreme Court during the 
Survey period have not fulfilled these and other relatively simple 
requirements. The court's reaction has been swift and 1;ure: summary 
dismissal or remand of the appeal and/or the imposition of heavy 
costs.97 
95. 356 Mich. 434, 97 N.W.2d 46 (1959). Also see White v. Sadler, 350 Mich. 
511, 87 N.W.2d 192 (1957); Miller & Wunsch, Civil Procedure, 1960 Survey of Mich. 
Law, 7 Wayne L. Rev. 7 at 28 (1960) and King & Wunsch, 1958 Survey of Mich. 
Law,S Wayne L. Rev. 175 at 184 (1958). 
96. M.C.R. 67 and 68. 
97. Harvey v. Lewis, 363 Mich. 232, 109 N.W.2d 143 (1961) (Briefs and ap-
pendices of appellants "stricken for gross violations" of M.C.R. 67. Appeal dismissed 
unless appellant complies with court rules.); Daley v. Gruber, 362 Mich. 366, 107 
N.W.2d 209 (1961) (Insufficient testimony to enable court to detem:.ine whether find-
ings were against the weight of evidence. Appellee awarded minimum bar rate for 
office work for 35% hours spent augmenting appellant's appendb:.); Templin v. Town-
ship of Nottawa, 362 Mich. 257, 106 N.W.2d 825 (1961) (Appellant's appendi.~ omitted 
testimony. Appellee denied costs because he failed to object to appellant's appendi.~ and 
to comply with appendix requirements of M.C.R. 68, § 6.); Dalenko v. Tucker, 362 
Mich. 218, 106 N.W.2d 741 (1961) (Failure to include pleadings and too little testi-
mony. Appeal dismissed.); Thomson v. City of Dearborn, 362 Mich. 1, 106 N.W.2d 
129 (1960) (Failure to include answer and ordinances in appendix. Case remanded for 
investigation under M.C.R. 70, § 5.); Harden v. Widovich, 361 Mich. 422, 105 N.W.2d 
224 (1960) (Insufficient testimony from record, brief omitted page reference to ap-
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The statute98 provides for the issuance of writs of error "of 
course" in certain cases involving more than $500 and for discretionary 
issuance of the writ in all other cases. In addition, it states: Pro-
vided, however, That if said case (ordinarily calling for discretionary 
issuance) involves a construction of the constitution or of any statute 
of this state, or any matters of great public importance or involves 
the contest of a will, such application need only show such fact and, 
when filed, the writ of error shall issue of course." However, Court 
Rule 60, which provides for appeals by leave and of course, makes 
no special provision for appeals of right in the four situations enu-
merated in the statute. In the interesting and noteworthy case of 
American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Grier99 the question 
was raised whether, under the terms of the statute, plaintiff was 
entitled as a matter of right to claim an appeal without leave from 
an interlocutory order denying his motion for summary judgment 
in a case of public importance involving the Constitution of the 
United States, to wit: Whether a judgment entered on an arbitration 
award in New York ~s entitled to full faith and credit in Michigan 
where defendant was not personally served with process but, under 
New York law, was deemed to have consented to jurisdiction by 
entering into a contract providing for arbitration in New York. The 
Michigan Supreme Court held that the denial of plaintiff's motion 
was not final and, therefore, that he was not entitled to appeal as 
of right. In dicta, however, the majority, through Mr. Justice Black, 
indicated that the court should not recognize the statutory grounds, 
enumerated above, as separate reasons for granting appeals as of 
right, for to do so would open the floodgate to appeals in which the 
raising of the statutory grounds might only be a device to secure 
automatic review. Furthermore, the court indicated that the word 
"application" in the statute requires that even if the statute is fol-
lowed, the appellant must file an application (request leave) before 
the appeal will be granted.loo Justices Edwards, Smith and Souris 
would have held that the court is required by the statute to grant the 
appeal as of right. 
The troublesome question of what constitutes a final, as opposed 
to an interlocutory, decree was also raised in Detroit Trust Co. v. 
Blakely.lol There a petition for an order requiring repayment of 
certain attorney's fees paid out of the corpus of a trust was brought 
pendL't and insufficient statement of facts. Appellee awarded minimum bar rate for 
40 hours work.). 
98. Mich. Compo Laws § 650.1 (Supp. 1956), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.2591 (1943). 
99. 363 Mich. 175, 108 N.W.2d 831 (1961). 
100. See Honigman, Mich. Court Rules Annot. 165, 166 (Supp. 1959). 
101. 359 Mich. 621, 103 N.W.2d 413 (1960). 
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in chancery on behalf of one beneficiary. The trial ·court held the 
payment to be proper and petitioner claimed an appeal as of right. 
The court held that the trial court's order upholding the validity of 
the payment was final and, therefore, appealable, and indicated that 
the matter may not be raised again when the trustees seek allowance 
of their accounts. As pointed out by the dissenters, Justices Black, 
Kavanagh and Souris, this decision seems to open the door to piece-
meal litigation and appeal of the myriad minor questions which can 
arise in the enforcement of trusts under circumstances which do 
not conveniently afford opportunity for all interested parties to join 
in the proceedings. 
In other cases touching on the matter of appellate review the 
court held (1) that the refusal of a judge in a divorce case to permit 
appellant to make a separate record of excluded testimonyl02 was 
not error where the record did not show what was material was 
excluded and where counsel did not indicate what he expected to find 
or prove by such material;103 (2) that a circuit court motion for a 
nunc pro tunc certificate of the trial judge that the controversy 
, involves more than $500104 was properly granted under the correcting 
power of the circuit court105 where it was clear from the record that 
more than $500 was involved and where appellee did not object to 
appellant's failure to secure leave to appeal or file the certificate until 
appellant's brief had been filed in the Supreme Court; failure to file the 
certificate strictly in accordance with Court Rule 60, section 1 (d) 
did not affect the Supreme Court's jurisdiction of the appeal;1011 
(3) that the Supreme Court should not on appellanl:'s motion add 
items to the record on appeal which were not before the trial judge 
and then reverse on the basis of these items101 and (4) that the time 
limited for taking an appeal to the Supreme Court under Court Rule 
57 does not commence to run until the order, judgmellt or decree to 
be appealed, whether it be separately prepared for filing or written 
into the journal, is actually signed by the judge "and that unless the 
circuit court journal entry clearly indicates the date of signature or 
unless a separate order of dismissal is signed and filed, it will not 
be presumed that the judge signed the journal entry on the date of 
decision.mos 
102. See Mich. Compo Laws § 617.5 (194S), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.S53 (193S). 
103. Lazerow v. Lazerow, 362 Mich. 27, 106 N.W.2d 542 (1960). 
104. See M.C.R. 60, § l(d). 
105. See M.C.R. 56, § 2. 
106. Sweet v. RingweIski, 362 Mich. 13S, 106 N.W.2d 742 (1961). 
107. Rene J. DeLorme, Inc. v. Union Square Agency, Inc., 362 Mich. 192, 106 
N.W.2d 754 (1961) (By an equally divided court). 
lOS. Grist v. Upjohn Co., 362 Mich. 470, 107 N.W.2d 763 (1961). 
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Declaratory Judgments: In a case of first impression in Michi-
gan the Supreme Court held that a wife's suit to have her husband's 
Nevada divorce decree declared invalid constitutes an "actual con-
troversy" and is, therefore, a proper subject for declaratory judg-
ment.lOO 
In Taylor v. StatellO the court decided that the declaratory 
judgment actlll applies only to courts of general jurisdiction. Specifi-
cally, the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction to grant a declaration 
of rights, even if it be a court of record.ll2 The decision was based 
on the somewhat tenuous theory that section two of the act provides 
that petitions for declarations of rights may be brought on either 
the law or equity side of the court, that the court of claims is a legisla-
tive court of limited jurisdiction which has no equity side and, there-
fore, that the act was not intended to apply to the court of claims. 
109. Henry v. Henry, 362 Mich. 85, 106 N.W.2d 570 (1960). 
110. 360 Mich. 146, 103 N.W.2d 769 (1960). 
111. Mich. Compo Laws § 691.501 et seq. (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.501 
(1938). 
112. The act provides that "No action or proceeding in any court of record shall 
be open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment, decree or 
order is sought thereby." 
